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BALLOTS.

Against the dissent of three judges, the Supreme Court
of Kansas lays down in Parker v. Hughes, 67 Pac. 637, a
very important rule in regard to the marking
of ballots. It is there held that when one's
name appears upon a ballot more than once as a candidate
fDr the-same office, upon two or more tickets on the same
ballot, and such name is maiked with a cross-mark in the
squares opposite the same two or more times, such doublenrrked ballot is not thereby made void, but must be counted,
tln excess of marks being mere surplusage.
Double
Marking

BOUNDARIES.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana holds in State v. Burtoz, 31 Southern, 293, that the description of a boundary
rhread
may be a matter of construction for the court,
d River
and therefore a question of law, but the ascertaiment of it with a view to its location is a question of fact.
Sc; too, what is "the middle" of a river is a question of
lay; but once defining that "the middle" of a river is the
ha!-way point between its banks, or that the thread of the
stnam is its middle, it is a question of fact to determine
wlEther an object in the river is on the one side or the other
of the middle as thus defined. "The thread" of a stream,
it held, is the line midway between the banks at the ordimry stage of waiter, without regard to the channel or the
loviest and deepest part of the stream. See State v. McAdfms, 31 Southern, 187.
BUS1WESS COMPETITION.
Ii West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 40
S. 1.. 591, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
holds that one may, without liability, in furtherInttferlng
with u iness
of thers

ance of his own interest in the competition of

business, establish any works competing with

anober, and nay induce customers of that other to with351
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draw their patronage from him, in order to obtain business
for Timself, though it injure, and is intended to, injure, that
other person's business, if there is no contract between such
person and his customers. The motive of the person so
doing, though malicious, is not material, his acts being lawful. But if he induce such withdrawal of custom not in
bona fide neighborly advice, nor in free right of competition
to benefit his own business, but wantonly only to injure that
other person, he is liable. And it is further held that what
one may do thus, several, with the same justification, may
combine to do.

CARRIERS.

Actual discrimination in rates charged is necessary to costitute a violation of the interstate commerce act; and ihe
mere making or offering of a discriminating
Interstate
Commerce
rate, under which it is not shown that any slipLaw
ment was ever made, constitutes no legal injiry
to a shipper who is charged a higher rate: United Sttes
Circuit Court (E. D. Pennsylvania) in Lehigh Valley R.
Co. v. Rainey, 112 Fed. 487.

In Scofeld v. Pennsylvania Co., 112.Fed. 855, the U S.
Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit), holds that wlere.
Takingaup
a railroad company agrees to transport a )asTicket
senger between specified points, with a rigli to
stop off at an intermediate point, and the ticket coupon covering the distance between such points is taken up by the
company's conductor before reaching the intermediate point,
over the passenger's objection, the fact that the passeiger
was thus left without written evidence of his right to resnime
his journey from the place of stop-over gives the condictor
of a later train no authority to eject the passenger. The
policy of this ruling may well be questioned since it rives
the conductor of the second train no evidence of the passenger's right thereon except the word of such passeiger.
A safer rule would seem to require the passenger to par his
fare when demanded by the second conductor, and thei allow him to recover against the road for breach of contact:
See Frederick v. M. H. & 0. R. Co., 37 Mich. 342.
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One phase of the interesting question of relation between
common carriers and a terminal company appears in Frazier
Terminal
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 62 N. E. 73 I .
Company

The Massachusetts law, Acts 1896, c. 516, § i,

declares that the Boston Terminal Company is created to
maintain a station and to provide and operate adequate
terminal facilities for several railroad companies, and for
the accommodation of the public in connection therewith.
Section 2 authorizes each of five railroads to subscribe to
one-fifth of the terminal company's stock. Section 3 places
the immediate government and direction of the affairs of the
company in five trustees, one of whom may be appointed by
each of the five railroads. Section 9 provides that oncompletion of the station all said railroads shall use the same, and
that the company may contract with either of the railroads
for the use of such separate portion as may be necessary for
their respective use. Under these provisions the question
arose when the relation of carrier and passenger ceased, and
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in the
case above referred to that a railroad which uses the station
only as required by the statute, and has not contracted for
the use of any separate portion thereof, discharges its duty
to a passenger, whom it has contracted to carry to Boston,
when the passenger alights in safety on the platform of the
station, and is not liable for injury received by him while
going through the station.
CORPORATIONS.

In Reagan v. First National Bank of Chicago, 62 N. E.
7Ol, it is held by the Supreme Court of Indiana that where
Preference
an insolvent corporation, which cannot mortInvalidity
gage its property without the consent of a majority of the holders of the preferred stock, in order to obtain
such consent prefers such stockholders to unsecured creditors, the preference renders the mortgage not only invalid as
to such stockholders, but invalid as a whole. In answer to the
arguments of counsel seeking to uphold the mortgage, even
though the preference should fall, the court says: "Counsel
seemingly overlook the fact that the very thing which made
it possible for the corporation to execute the mortgage at
all was the illegal agreement between it, Gates and Harrison
[two preferred stockholders] to the effect that their stock
claims should be secured by the mortgage as a reward for
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their consent to its execution. That was the consideration
of their consent, and the evil thereof under the stipulations
and terms of the mortgage permeated the instrument as an
entirety.'"
HOTE

IPI

R.

In Carhartv. Wainman, 40 S. E. 781, the petiition alleged
that the plaintiff was a guest at a hotel, and delivered a
baggage check given him by a railway corn-Baggage
of Guest
pany, to the porter of the hotel, whose business
it was to receive baggage and deliver it to the guests, and
that thereafter the plaintiff made demand upon the proprietor
for the baggage or the check, and the proprietor refused to
deliver either. The defendant demurred. But the Supreme
Court of Georgia holds that the petition set forth a cause of
action against the proprietor of the hotel, and should not
have been dismissed upon demurrer. The delivery of the
check, it is said, was prima facie evidence of a delivery of the
baggage: 4 Elliott, R. R. § 16,557.
HUSBAND AND WlI

.

Where, in order to secure a loan and the acceptance of a
mortgage on the joint property of a husband and wife as
security therefor, they both state that the money
wife
as Suroty

is for their joint use and improvement of such

property, the wife is estopped from claiming that the loan
was for her husband, and she only a surety: Lavene v. Tamecke, 62 N.- E. 51o. The case is of peculiar interest to practitioners in those States where a wife is not allowed to become an accommodation endorser for her husband.
JURISDICTION.

The U. S. Circuit Court (E. D. Missouri) holds in
Greene County Bank v. Teasdale Commission Co., 112
Amount In Fed. 8oi, that in an action for the recovery of
controveny

money only, the amount of damages claimed de-

terminus the jurisdiction, unless the declaration on its face
shows that such amount is claimed in bad faith, and merely
to give a colorable jurisdiction. As to the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts with reference to the amount in controversy, see
notes to Aner v. Lombard, 19 C. C. A. 75; Shoe Co. v.
Roper, 36 C. C. A. 459.
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JURY TRIAL.

The Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution provides that in all controversies concerning property,
mefo

except in cases where the previous practice has

been otherwise, the parties have a right to trial
by jury. Construing this provision, the Supreme Judicial
Court of that State holds in Parker v. Simpson, 62 N. E.
401, that it does not give the respondent in a bill in equity
a jury trial as to issues of fact as a matter of right, but the
granting thereof is within the discretion of the court. The
court makes a most thorough discussion of the subject and
gives an interesting review of the judicial history of the colonial and provincial periods. The court in concluding its opinion says: "The article as it now stands is a declaration 6f the
common-law right to a trial by jury, and in no way is inconsistent with the establishment of a court of chancery having
general jurisdiction, as it was at the time of the adoption of
the constitution, and proceeding in accordance with its fundamental rules of practice as- then existing. One of these
rules was that trial by jury should be at the discretion of the
cQurt." The case finds its general interest in consequence of
the presence of substantially similar constitutional provisions
in the other States.
IXASR.

The summary remedies to enable a landlord to obtain possession of leased property under certain conditions are so
Contructon,

Re-entr

general as to make the decision of the Court of
Appeals of New York in Michaels v. Fishel, 62

N. E. 425, of more than local interest. In that case the
lease reserved to the lessors the right upon default "into and
upon said premises to re-enter," and the same to have again
as in their first and former estate, and the lessee covenianted
to pay any deficiengy arising on the reletting of the premises
after such re-entry by the lessors as his agents. The court
holds this language to cover only a re-entry in the technical
sense as known to the common law by ejectment, and not
to include a removal of the lessee by statutory summary proceedings. Two judges dissent on the ground that under
this provision any legal remedy could be invoked by the landlord to "repossess and enjoy" their former estate. The majority proceed on the ground that the term was a purely
technical one found in the midst of the quaint language of
ancient leases, and that the presumption arises that the parties
used it in its strict common-law. meaning..
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The question of when the Statute of Limitations begins
to run in actions which have originated in consequence of
Actions
some fraud practiced by the defendant is confor Fraud
stantly presenting itself in some new form. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska, dealing with this point in Forsyth v. Easterday,89 N. W. 4o7, holds that the recording of
a fraudulent deed is not of itself, under all cii'cumstances,
sufficient to charge all parties with notice of the fraud. When
accompanied with circumstances sufficient to put a person
of ordinary intelligence and prudence upon inquiry, which
if pursued would lead to a discovery of the fraud, the statute begins to run from the recording of the deed, but not
otherwise: Compare Wright v. Davis, 28 Nebr. 479.
MARRIAGE.

In Davis v. Pryor, 112 Fed. :274, the facts showed that the

defendant was living with a certain woman under circumstances which, the court decided, constituted a
Validity
of Marriage
Promise

common-law marriage. The defendant assured
that he was not married to this woman and

promised plaintiff to marry her. Upon this promise the
action was subsequently brought, and the U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) holds "that where a woman has
knowledge that the man has for many years lived and cohabited with another woman in the relation of husband and
wife, she is chargeable with notice that he is married, and.
cannot maintain an action for breach of the contract on the
ground that he represented himself to be unmarried.
NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in
Ainsworth v. Lakin, 62 N. E. 746, that where walls of a
Walls of

building remain standing after its destruction

by fire, but cannot be utilized in rebuilding, the
owner is not liable for an injury caused by the
fall thereof until he has had a reasonable time in which to
make investigation and take precautions to prevent the wall
from falling; but after the expiration of such time he is
liable, if he allows the walls to remain standing, for the failure to use care sufficient to prevent absolutely injury from
the wall, except such as may result from vis major, acts of
public enemies, or wrongful acts of third persons which
human foresight could not reasonably foresee.
a Burned
Building
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PARTNERSHIP.

In Norman v. Jackson Fertilizer Co., 31 Southern, 419,
it appeared that two of four members of a partnership sold
out to the other two, who assumed all the debts
Dissolution
Assumption
of the firm. The holder of a note of the first
of Debts
firm, who knew of the sale and dissolution of
that firm, but did not know or assent to the terms agreed
with the new firm to extend the note for another season on
condition of their buying the kind of goods he furnished, exclusively of him. The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds
that this did not release the selling partners, nor were they
released by the failure of the holder of the note to sue until
the new firm became bankrupt: See Rawson v. Taylor, 30
Ohio St. 389.
RAILROADS.

In Central Trust Co. of New York v. Western North
112 Fed. 475, the U. S. Circuit Court (W.
Effect of Sale D. North Carolina) holds that on a sale under a
under
decree of forecl6sure of all the property and
CarolinaR. Co.,
Foreclosure

franchises of a railroad company, mortgaged by

it as permitted by its charter, and the conveyance of such
property and franchises to the purchaser, as directed by the
court, the company is devested of all its right, title and interest therein, and has only remaining its franchise to exist,
as a corporation; and it cannot, by any act or negligence of its
own, thereafter subject the property so sold or the franchise
of the corporation to exercise the rights, powers and privileges of a railroad company in connection therewith, to
liability: Compare Railroad Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S.
501.
REPIEVIN.

The practice in Pennsylvania under the Laws of Pennsylvania, 190I, page 88, requires an affidavit of defence from
the defendant in the action of replevin. In
Affidavit of
Defence In
Uncapher v. B. & 0. R. Co., 112 Fed. 899, the
Pennsylvania affidavit filed in compliance with the act stated

that the defendant had no knowledge as to who was the
owner of the.goods, and that it was in actual possession as a
carrier for hire, and received such possession not from the
plaintiff, but from another. The U. S. Circuit Court (E. D.
Pennsylvania) holds that such affidavit is sufficient to put the
plaintiff to proof -of his title.

